Background This study provides an empirical investigation into differential time preferences between money and quality of life. Thus far, time preference investigations in health have mostly involved life-years gained and lives saved. However, the quality-adjusted life-year, which is recommended by several bodies, is a multiplicative measure of life duration and quality of life. To our knowledge, our study is the first to follow this approach specifically for quality of life. Methods A questionnaire was developed to elicit time preferences for quality of life and for money, and it was distributed to a representative sample of the Dutch population. We also investigated the impact of population characteristics, such as current health state, optimistic/ pessimistic future views or gender, on time preferences. Results We found that discount rates for both money and quality of life decrease with increasing time of delay, with rates of the former being consistently at least two times higher than those of the latter. Similar trends in time preferences were observed across the subgroups, with the exception of the relatively high education subgroup. Conclusion In agreement with the results of other studies, our empirically derived discount rates are higher than the rates featured in national guidelines for health care economic assessment. Our empirical study adds to the evidence for differential discounting, both with regards to money and health, as well as in time.
Introduction
National guidelines for health-economic and pharmacoeconomic evaluation have unequivocally expressed the need to discount for valid economic assessments in health care. For example, European bodies-such as the College voor Zorgverzekeringen (CvZ) in the Netherlands, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom, Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) in Scotland, Tandvards-och LakemedelsformansVerket (TLV) in Sweden and Kennis Centrum (KCE) in Belgium-design, discuss and revise guidelines on discounting [1] . However, the exact methods in discounting remain a revolving issue in discussions among health economists. One point of concern is how to discount health gains such as life-years or the multiplicative composite of the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY). The necessity for discounting stems from the existence of time preference. In general, the present time is preferred over the future. While the background of discounting was from a rather psychological nature, the calculus is straightforward, with roots in financial literature. The mathematical structure that is commonly adopted is inverse interest calculus, i.e. constant exponential discounting. For example, if a 4 % discount rate (or interest rate) is assumed per annum, then €1,000 in t years' time would be discounted down to €1,000/1.04 t . The latter represents the present value of €1,000 in the present time.
It is well known that the choice of the discount rate heavily impacts the cost effectiveness of different types of medical interventions. This is particularly true for interventions, such as vaccination programmes, that require major investments in the present but render health gains in the far future. For such cases, the practice of discounting heavily increases the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). For example, vaccination for human papilloma virus (HPV) involves savings in cancer costs, reductions in mortality and gains in QALY for all decennia following teenage vaccination. However, discounting at different rates ranging up to 4 % may reduce savings and QALYs up to fivefold [2, 3] . This reduction corresponds to a fivefold increase in the ICER for HPV vaccination, compared with the undiscounted ratio. Cost-effectiveness ratios of infant vaccination programmes against potentially lethal infectious diseases are also strongly influenced by discounting. Take, for example, the infant pneumococcal vaccination programmes that have been implemented worldwide in the last 10 years to avert invasive pneumococcal diseases and related mortality in infants. From the clinicians' point of view, saving an infant's life represents 80 life-years gained (the approximate average life expectancy at birth) [4] . However, from the perspective of health economists, a 4 % discount rate for health-using the straightforward discounting formula of constant exponential discountingreduces the 80 physical and undiscounted life-years to approximately 20 discounted life-years. Again, this fourfold reduction in the life-years gained was grossly mirrored by a fourfold increase in the cost-effectiveness ratio for pneumococcal vaccination [5, 6] . For both examples, discounting may crucially bring the ICER above the countryspecific willingness-to-pay threshold, compared with no discounting or discounting at a low rate, such as 1.5 %.
While there is a broad consensus to discount, there is still no agreement regarding discounting of health gains. In addition, the specific sources for inferring and pooling an exact health discount rate are much disputed. Some have argued that the discount rate for health should be directly related to the real rate of return on investment, the interest rate on government bonds or the long-term rate of economic growth [7] . However, others have suggested that the health discount rate should be theoretically based on the time preference for health [8] . To date, most discussions on discounting have been on whether to use equal or differential discount rates for health and costs. Several authors have used the argument of consistency to justify application of the same discount rate for both health and monetary gains. The rationale for equal discounting dates back to the landmark paper by Keeler and Cretin [9] and their postponement paradox. They argued that discounting costs and effects at different rates would result in potential inertia in decision making because it would matter whether one implemented a health care programme now or postponed it into the future, with an improving cost-effectiveness ratio. Gravelle and Smith [10] and Klok et al. [11] , however, opposed this argument, suggesting that the postponement paradox has a fundamental assumption that might not hold true. Gravelle and Smith pointed out that differential rates might be appropriate because the monetary value of health may change over time and is not necessarily constant as assumed by Keeler and Cretin. The discussions of Gravelle and Smith have led some countries to adopt differential discounting, where health gains are discounted at a lower rate than costs and savings. Klok et al. additionally pointed out that postponement of potential interventions is rather theoretical and not politically realistic.
On the basis of the work of Gravelle and Smith [10] , the UK was the first country to adopt differential discounting around the turn of the century, with discount rates of 6 % for costs and 1.5 % for health. However, the UK changed back in 2004 to equal discounting, again citing the landmark paper by Keeler and Cretin. During the same time, Klok et al. [11] adapted the Gravelle and Smith model in the Netherlands, in which they estimated a 4 % discount rate for costs and 1.5 % for health. This study subsequently led to a change from equal to differential discounting in the Dutch guidelines. The reversals in opposing directions on discounting policies in the UK and the Netherlands led to an interesting polemic between authors who were involved in NICE and in the Dutch guidelines [12, 13] . Belgium followed the Dutch approach a few years later [14] . Notably, the two 'low countries' are the only ones in the world prescribing differential discounting at the present time [14, 15] .
Time preference is a well-known and omnipresent feature [16] . A very recent issue in discounting concerns the concept of decreasing discount rates, which is a distinct issue from the exponential specification of the discount function. Time-adjusted discount rates have been suggested by several authors, including the British Treasury [17], Beutels et al. [18] and Balazon et al. [19] (see Table 1 ).
However, the methodologies for applying decreasing discount rates are numerous, including those used in Table 1 , stepwise discounting and time-shifted discounting [3, 20] . In addition, specific functional forms such as hyperbolic discounting have been suggested to reflect the declining rate pattern [3] . Supported by empirical evidence, these approaches may better reflect time preference as commonly encountered in practice.
Various countries, including the Netherlands, have specified in their guidelines that rates based on population preferences are preferred over proxy rates from government bonds [15] . The general recommendation is to consider time preferences from a societal perspective, with considerations given for intergenerational equity. Such recommendations enhance the use of empirical methods for measurement of discount rates. Empirical approaches on discounting have been undertaken before in various instances, and it is well known that measured rates might deviate-sometimes strongly-from recommended rates in guidelines [21] .
Individual analyses, as provided in this study, may provide crucial insights into how discount rates in guidelines could better reflect population characteristics and preferences. For this purpose, a questionnaire to measure discount rates for money and health was developed, and a representative and random sample of individuals from the Dutch population was surveyed. This study aimed (1) to provide further empirical evidence on the rationale for differential discounting; (2) to assess the impact of certain population characteristics on time preferences; and (3) to elicit empirically measured population time preferences on money and quality of life regarding timing in the future.
Methods
A questionnaire was developed with specific questions aiming to elicit time preferences for money and health (see the Appendix in the Electronic Supplementary Material). A pilot study using the draft questionnaire was performed with a sample of first-year pharmacy students [22] . On the basis of findings from the pilot study, the questionnaire was finetuned. In particular, questions were optimized regarding clarity of language and consistency, i.e. as much as possible, the method of elicitation for health and wealth were formulated in a similar fashion to allow for comparability of time preferences between both outcomes. The pilot study had strengthened the initial idea regarding the appropriateness and validity of the questions and enabled us to further pinpoint questions in any detail that was considered relevant. For the current purpose, the focus was on money and quality of life.
Briefly, questions were developed in detail with consideration of:
• The clarity of the questions and how the questions would be conceived and interpreted; • The possibility to relate the answers to the health states of the individuals; • The possibility to elicit time preferences for money and health separately; and • The possibility to relate discount rates to optimistic or pessimistic views about the future with regard to money and health.
A representative sample of the Dutch population was identified through a sampling process, which was managed by Survey Sampling International (Rotterdam, the Netherlands; http://www.surveysampling.com). In particular, a sample of 847 individuals completed the questionnaire in 2011. In contrast to the analysis in Parouty et al. [22] , the current analysis did not impose any exclusion criteria on the individuals' responses to limit potential bias in the representativeness of the sample.
The respondents were asked to compare a monetary gain 1 year from now with a sum of money to which they would be indifferent after four different delays (5, 10, 20 and 40 years).With regard to quality of life, a scale was utilized where 0 % represented the worst imaginable health state and 100 % represented the best imaginable health state. Individuals were asked to imagine that a percentage of their current quality of life would be temporarily removed for 1 year in 1 year's time. Compared with the utility loss at 1 year from the present, individuals were asked to state the percentages to which they would be indifferent after future delays of 5, 10, 20 and 40 years. In order to obtain the discount rates for quality of life, a perfect negative corre- lation between loss of health quality and gain in health quality was assumed. In other words, negative preferences for losses mirrored positive preferences for gains of equal magnitude. Thus, negative preferences for disutility and positive preferences for utility would be symmetric. Respondents were categorized into different mutually exclusive subgroups. Subgroup analyses were performed on gender, health states, education and optimistic/pessimistic views about the future. Gender was included because males and females may have different time preferences. Subgroups for health states were added because individuals with different health states may value current health differently. Questions from EuroQol (EQ-5D) and a visual analogue scale (VAS) were used to determine health state-related subgroups (see the Appendix in the Electronic Supplementary Material). The division was based on a double-bounded binary choice followed by VAS. In brief, EQ-5D scores were calculated on the basis of the answers to the questions from B1 to B5. If the responses to EQ-5D resulted in equal scores, VAS scores from question B6 were then used. As a result, respondents were divided into two groups, one for an upper 50 % of health status and one for a lower 50 % of health status, termed 'high health status' and 'lower health status', respectively.
Numerous empirical investigations have suggested that there are diverging time preferences between individuals with relatively high education and those with lower education, where those with the former are more patient than those with the latter [23] . Because high educational attainment is associated with lower time preferences, the sample was partitioned into two groups. The 'relatively high education' group contained individuals who had at least a university education or medium to high professional training, while the 'relatively low education' group consisted of all others.
Time preferences have long been argued to be correlated with optimistic/pessimistic views about the future [24] , and increased optimism is associated with higher discount rates [25] . In our inferences, direct measurement of such beliefs was carried out. Respondents were asked about their general feelings regarding the future-in particular, whether one is positively or negatively inclined with regard to quality of life, life expectancy and income (See part D in the Appendix in the Electronic Supplementary Material).
Responses about the future that were numerically higher than the stated current average were deemed optimistic. In converse, responses that were lower than the current average were classified as pessimistic.
A future outcome, t 2 years from now, A t 2 , was brought back to t 1 ( with t 2 [ t 1 ) years from now, A t 1 , by discounting at a rate of r A per annum. Discount rates were pooled at each individual time point, using the formula:
where r A is the annual discount rate for A, A t 1 is the amount t 1 years from now, and A t 2 is the amount t 2 years from now.
A t i reflects either money or quality of life, corresponding to the questionnaires. A linear regression approach using individual sets of time preference, as described by Cropper [26] , was taken to assess potential divergences between discount rates for the different subgroups. Linear regression provides a useful way to investigate the differences across subgroups, particularly if the slopes of the subgroups are expected to be similar to that of the overall sample (for example, for males and females separately). As a result, the intercepts could roughly be interpreted as numerical markers of the differences in time preferences with respect to differing characteristics.
Results
The characteristics of the 847 individuals are presented in Table 2 . The subgroups of gender and health state were evenly divided between male/female and between relatively high/low health status, respectively. Of the sample population, 58 % had relatively high educational attainment. The proportions of respondents who provided optimistic responses on three, two, one and none of the questions were 45, 19, 17 and 19 %, respectively. It should be noted that the denominators for sub-analyses such as optimistic/pessimistic future perspectives might differ because not all questions were answered consistently by all eligible individuals. Overall discount rates for money and health are presented in Fig. 1 . The results showed that discount rates declined with increasing time of delay, which lent support to a decreasing discount rate function over a constant rate function. The mean discount rates for money and quality of life are shown in Table 3 .
Over the investigated range of time of delay, the annual discount rates for money were consistently at least two times higher than the annual discount rates for quality of life. This factor increased to at least eight times starting at a delay of 40 years. It is interesting to compare the relative decrease in this empirical study with those proposed by others (see Table 1 ).
Discount rates for money by male and female respondents are shown in Fig. 2 . A similar pattern of decreasing discount rates with increasing time of delay was observed. The annual discount rates of female respondents were above the rates of male respondents, ranging from an increase of 13 % for short delays to 7 % for the longest delay.
The discount rate profiles for optimistic and pessimistic respondents are shown in Fig. 3 . Although the profiles seemed to regress to a mean at around a delay of 5 years from the present, the optimistic individuals tended to elicit higher discount rates. This observation is in line with the theoretical foundation of discounting, where individuals with a very pessimistic view about the future could even start exhibiting negative discount rates. This, however, was not observed in our data. Figure 4 presents the discounting results by health status. Similar to the comparison between optimistic and pessimistic individuals, respondents in the upper and low health states shared similar discount rates for the 5-year delay. However, those in the lower 50th percentile of EQ-5D/VAS had discount rates that were 103 % higher than those of their upper health counterparts at the longest time of delay.
While differing health states tend to reflect differing time preferences, it seemed natural that psychological aspects would also have an impact on time preferences. Individuals were further asked about their degree of optimism with regard to life expectancy, quality of life and income. Subgroups were compared with the overall sample for both money and quality of life. The discount rate functions for money for the overall sample and different subgroups are shown in Table 4 .
The decline in the discount rate for money was approximately the same across the subgroups. Indeed, the literature has a huge repository of such subgroup analysis with respect to money. Next, the regressions for the rate of time preference for quality of life are shown in Table 5 . With the exception of educational attainment, the same trends were observed for quality of life as for money.
Furthermore, the discount rates for both money and health decreased with increasing time of delay. This was indicated by the correlation coefficient of almost negative one, q t;r M ¼ À0:964 and q t;r Q ¼ À0:896, where q denotes the sample correlation coefficient for money and for quality of life, r M denotes the discount rate for money, and r Q denotes the discount rate for quality of life. Furthermore, linear regressions for money and health versus time of delay indicated that at all time points, the discount rate function for money was higher than that of health. Annual Discount Rate Delay (Years) Fig. 1 Annual discount rate for money (boxes) and health (triangles) plotted against time of delay 
Discussion and Conclusion
The trends found in this study followed what was known in the literature, particularly regarding the discounting of money. With the exception of those with a relatively high education, the other subgroups showed similar trends in time preferences for money and quality of life. Increasing the sample size to potentially reach statistically different regression lines for a certain subgroup would not only have been costly and time consuming but would also have been beyond the scope of this study. Our analysis observed that individuals with relatively high education had a higher time preference for quality of life but a lower time preference for money (as indicated by the intercept of Tables 4, 5 ). It is often suggested that individuals with higher education are more patient, which explains the lower time preference for money. However, Becker and Mulligan [27] argued that schooling trains the imagination of future rewards and better foresight, and that ''educated people should be more productive at reducing the remoteness of future pleasures''. Thus, the concurrent expectations for income to increase and health to decrease over time provide a plausible explanation for a higher time preference for quality of life. In Fischer's words, it appears that educated individuals discount future health at a high rate because of ''the thought that provision for the present is necessary both for the present itself and for the future as well'' [28] . In other words, they foresee the need for health in the present time to survive in the future. Other than the relatively highly educated subgroup, this study, however, consistently observed a lower discount rate for quality of life compared with money. Our results might diverge from those of other studies [29] , especially considering that variations in question formulation are known to yield varying results [30] . It should be noted again that we asked respondents for their individual preferences. In general, the societal perspective is the major recommendation for the purpose of drafting policies. However, pooling a rate for society presents numerous challenges. Averaging of results from individuals who contribute to the data set is often performed, leading to heterogeneity over gender, attitudes and health status being averaged out (as was the case for timing aversions). Therefore, the consideration of an 'average individual' should entangle the preferences of these subgroups in an integrated manner. However, deriving rates for society in such a statistical manner is often scorned for assuming an interpersonal comparison of utility. Other studies have explicitly asked the individuals to take a societal perspective, where the individual ought to consider the health of others. In a UK-wide TEMPUS project, Cairns and Van Der Pol not only investigated individual rates but also considered individuals making decisions on behalf of others, where the individual might express less impatience for gains for others compared with gains for oneself [31] . Empirical investigation with individuals taking a societal perspective also has limitations, the most important of which pertains to an inference on societal preferences that is based on empirical investigation of individuals. In the TEMPUS project, there were no statistical differences in time preference of individuals and time preference of individuals taking a societal perspective. However, averaging individual rates provides some indication about societal rates, especially relative differences among empirical rates.
It is often observed in the literature that empirical discount rates are typically higher than the rates featured in various national guidelines for pharmacoeconomic or health economic purposes [1] . With this in mind, rather than focusing on exact levels of discounting, we draw inferences from the relative differences between discount rates for health and money and on the decreasing trends with time of delay. The decreasing trends in the discount rates that were observed in this study are in line with suggestions made in the literature and some guidelines [16, 18, 19, 32 ].Yet, we do not often notice decreasing discount rates in practice. However, one might expect an uptake of this methodology, particularly in the area of long-term prevention such as vaccination programmes. An example of an application of decreasing discount rates involved HPV vaccination where hyperbolic functions were used to model the decrease in the discount rate over time [3] . The discussion on differential discounting of money and health has a history dating back at least two decades [33] . Thus far, countries for which this discussion actually impacted guidance on discount rates are the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium [14, 15, 17] . As mentioned above, the latter two countries shifted to differential discounting around 2004, whereas the UK reversed course from differential discounting to equal discounting. The ongoing discussion in the UK is reflected in a recent UK initiative [34] recommending that NICE should allow differential discounting of costs and health effects if interventions involve investment upfront and benefits accruing over future delays (e.g. interventions in children, prevention and public health). HPV vaccination would indeed fit under these new guidelines. Furthermore, the report also refers to the Treasury's Green Book [17] , which had previously suggested decreasing discounting with increasing delays. Both of these recommendations are in line with our (and others') empirical findings.
The current dominating directive in discounting methodology seems to be provided by discussions between NICE and related institutions and authors [11] [12] [13] 35] . The recent UK report [34] summarized that on the one hand, societal time preference can be considered to reflect pure time preference, and on the other hand, it can be considered to reflect growth of happiness from consumption. The latter reduces the marginal utility of additional units. Uncertainty is implicit in all aspects of money and health-related decisions. For example, uncertainty in the economic analysis of HPV vaccines may relate to the fact that the potential benefits of prevention of cervical cancers are realized decades after the actual vaccination. It is uncertain in the meantime whether an effective pharmacotherapy for this cancer might be developed. This uncertainty clearly impacts economic aspects (savings on cancer costs) and health aspects (death and quality losses due to cancer). A discount rate of 1.5 % may adequately reflect this part of time preference for a broad range of developed economies, including the UK and the Netherlands. Higher rates for economic growth than for life expectancy give additional motivation for a higher overall time preference for money, which is often chosen in the range of 3-5 % [1, 7, 10, 11, 35] . This is fully in line with the Dutch and Belgium pharmacoeconomic guidelines [14, 15] .
